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DRIGGS LAW ENFORCEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Many cities in Idaho have historically contracted with their county sheriff for police
services. Because county sheriffs are charged with enforcing Idaho Code countywide,
these arrangements often allow the sheriff to also enforce city ordinances. This
arrangement provides small towns access to an increased police presence without
incurring the expense of maintaining their own department. The sheriff, in turn, receives
more financial resources to improve service delivery. For many cities and counties, it is a
mutually beneficial arrangement that acknowledges the unique challenges facing smalltowns and rural communities.
For many years, the City of Driggs contracted with the Teton County Sheriff’s Office
(TCSO) for police services under just such an arrangement. However, Driggs officials
canceled their contract with TCSO in 2016. City officials alleged inadequate service
delivery, poor follow-through and a lack of transparency, combined with a belief that their
resources would be better directed elsewhere. Officials from TCSO disagree with this
perception.
This study aims to review the issues surrounding the Driggs contract with TCSO and the
circumstances that led to its cancellation. Combining academic research, stakeholder
interviews and budgetary analysis, we consider five law enforcement alternatives available
for Driggs’ officials to better inform their decisions regarding law enforcement. These
alternatives include maintaining the status quo with no county contract, restoring a
contract for service, establishing a code enforcement officer position, creating a city-level
police department and forming a large-scale unified system. Each of these options has its
own cost structure and its own unique challenges that policymakers must weigh.
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RESEARCH METHODS
In order to complete our analysis, the Idaho Policy Institute (IPI) research team conducted
a review of policing and police services that are pertinent to small cities like Driggs and
rural counties like Teton County, Idaho. Our review included academic studies, third-party
reports and articles associated with law enforcement models in small towns and rural
areas. The review encompassed a wide array of studies that analyzed the landscape of
policing across the United States (U.S.).
Additional material examined consisted of sources both governmental and professional,
including Idaho Code, opinions and guidelines of the Idaho Attorney General’s Office, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the International City/County Management Association
(ICMA) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).
To assess the competing interests and concerns of various stakeholders in Driggs
and Teton County, the IPI research team conducted a series of interviews with
stakeholders identified in consultation with the City of Driggs. Stakeholders included
representatives from the cities of Driggs, Victor and Tetonia; Teton County Board of
County Commissioners; Teton County Sheriff’s Office; Teton County Prosecutor’s Office;
the contract public defender for Teton County; Teton School District 401; Teton Regional
Economic Coalition; Teton Aviation; Huntsman Springs; and a former Teton County
Prosecutor.
We conducted a total of 15 interviews: 12 were in-person interviews conducted in April
2018 and three were phone interviews conducted in May 2018. We conducted the phone
interviews with stakeholders our research team was unable to meet in-person during
our research trip to Teton County in April 2018. Two members of the research team were
present for each interview and took separate notes throughout. These notes were later
compared for accuracy.

RURAL COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Small-town/rural crime and justice are not simply scaled-down versions of urban crime
and justice. Rather, they are shaped by several distinctive features, including geographic
isolation, lower ethnic/racial diversity, higher average age, and higher poverty rates (Pew
Research Center, 2018; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). However, despite evidence that about
half of U.S. police agencies employ fewer than ten full-time officers (Wilson and Grammich,
2012), research tends to focus on very large agencies.
Most research shows that small-town/rural law enforcement agencies have been able to
evolve - adapting to economic, technological, demographic and cultural changes. Several
law enforcement models have been developed but the benefits of each are contextdependent. The challenge facing local policy makers is to carefully assess the advantages
and pitfalls that each of these options would have in their jurisdiction in order to make the
most appropriate decision.
1

POLICE DEPARTMENTS AND SHERIFFS’ OFFICES
In 2012, there were 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies in the U.S., with
approximately 765,000 personnel (Wilson and Grammich, 2012). According to a report
published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) (2015), sheriffs’ offices accounted for
about 20 percent of the nation’s
general-purpose state and local
THE CONTRACT
law enforcement agencies and
employed about a third of all
The City of Driggs’ contract with the Teton
full-time general-purpose law
County Sheriff’s Office for additional coverage
enforcement personnel during 2013.
expired on September 30th, 2016. The nowBy virtue of its historical evolution,
expired contract encompassed the following:
the sheriff’s office has broader legal
responsibility and greater legal
Police Services. The Teton County Sheriff’s Office
authority in the range of activities
shall assume responsibility for protection and law
covered than those of local police
enforcement within the corporate boundaries
chiefs (Falcone & Wells, 1995).
of the City of Driggs, in combination with its
statutory duty to police the entire County. Final
oversight of all police and law enforcement activity
undertaken within the corporate limits of the City
lies with the Mayor of the City except for those
administrative operations and duties occurring
at the facilities of the County which reside within
the City, which are not related to law enforcement
activity within the City.
Security checks. The Sheriff’s Office shall conduct
nightly security checks of City infrastructure and
facilities. These shall include, but not be limited to
the following: City Airport, Wastewater Treatment
Plant, City Shop and Public Works Yard, City Parks,
City Building and Plaza, Visitor’s Center, Industrial
Building, City Parking Lots, and City Water
Facilities.
Enforcement of City ordinances. The Sheriff’s
Office shall enforce the ordinances of the City as
requested by the Mayor, in addition to the general
criminal and traffic law enforcement already
conducted pursuant to Idaho Statutes. Violations
which would constitute violations of either state
law or ordinances of the City shall be brought as
violations of state laws and all such violations shall
be brought before the county magistrates.
Directed patrols. Upon written or emailed request
of the Mayor, the Sheriff’s Office shall conduct
directed patrols in specific areas of the City. Upon
notification of areas of concern Sheriff’s Office
will work with the Mayor to develop a patrol plan
for the area of concern and appropriate reporting
arrangements.
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Some research suggests that
sheriffs will have stronger
community identification than
police chiefs. After interviewing
appointed police chiefs and elected
sheriffs from 16 different counties,
LaFrance and Placide (2009)
found that most of the sheriffs in
the sample averaged almost 20
more years of county residence
than police chiefs, and had served
in their current positions almost
twice as long as police chiefs.
This illustrates that the sheriff’s
authority often benefits from
strong relationships. On the other
hand, the authors identified a
significant difference in education
levels between sheriffs and chiefs,
with chiefs generally completing
more schooling. According to the
authors, this shows that police
chiefs in the sample had more of
an expert power base than sheriffs.
Furthermore, police chiefs are less
likely to sacrifice professional values
for political ones, since they obtain
office by appointment rather than
election. On the same note, the
police chief must work harder to
learn the language of the municipal

legislature (LaFrance and Placide, 2009). Finally, proponents of municipal policing claim
that such agencies can provide higher local control and more personalized services due to
their territorial scale. (Wilson and Grammich, 2012).
In the end, both leadership and management in law enforcement organizations are
influenced by local social networks and institutional contexts. While general education
levels, community ties, range of responsibilities and professional and political values are
very important in understanding the typical disparities between sheriffs’ offices and police
departments, different regions may be faced with different scenarios and, therefore,
should be analyzed case by case.

JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
The number of non-school special districts in the U.S. more than tripled between 1952
and 2012, going from 12,340 to 38,266 (Nelson & Stenberg, 2018). Traditional local
functions have become more intergovernmental and there are no longer exclusively local
problems and responses. Scholars and practitioners alike have agreed on the need for less
intergovernmental competition and more collaborative public management. A wide range
of responses to boundary-crossing issues has been implemented across the U.S. with
varying degrees of success (Nelson & Stenberg, 2018). These mechanisms include local
merger, regionalization, and shared and contract services.
Supporters of local mergers, or full consolidation, argue that combining two or more
units of governments into one entity can generate greater efficiency and lower costs,
primarily through improved economies of scale. Studies have indicated that consolidated
departments tend to have a significant advantage over stand-alone departments when
comparing per capita cost by service delivery type (Pennsylvania Economy League &
Institute for Public Policy and Economic Development, 2010). Research also suggests
that consolidation can lead to fewer disparities among residents of the region and enable
increased collaboration in other areas of local government (Nelson & Stenberg, 2018).
Regionalization takes place when a number of jurisdictions combine to police a
geographic area rather than a jurisdictional one (New Jersey State Association of
Chiefs of Police, 2017). In the regionalization model, the municipal and/or county law
enforcement entities involved remain legally separate, but partner in the delivery of
certain functions. Thus, they are not restricted by existing local boundaries in defining
their scope of responsibilities (Nelson & Stenberg, 2018). Among the potential benefits
provided by this model of law enforcement are the elimination of duplicated services,
increased cooperation between officers in neighboring jurisdictions, increased capacity in
specialized services and enhanced personnel development.
Law enforcement services can also be shared or contracted. The former consists in two or
more agencies combining certain functional units — emergency communications, dispatch,
records, etc. — while the latter is based on a formal contract to pay for law enforcement
services typically provided by larger jurisdictions to smaller ones (New Jersey State
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017).
Driggs faces the challenge of identifying the most adequate law enforcement arrangement
according to its needs and resources. The best-informed choice will depend on a context3

based analysis of different institutional environments, such as the ones mentioned above,
as well as the services, costs, responsibilities and organizational relationships associated
with each option.

DRIGGS LAW ENFORCEMENT
When elected officials in Driggs announced their intention not to renew the contract
with TCSO, they cited a failure to receive services, an ability to replace those services
privately at a lower cost and the argument that city taxpayers were “paying twice” for
law enforcement that the county was already statutorily mandated to provide (Stuntz,
2017). Based on this and our own stakeholder interviews, we have identified the following
challenges that officials in Driggs face: 1) City and county institutional responsibilities; 2)
Code enforcement responsibility; 3) Transparency and accountability; 4) Public security
and services provided; and 5) Local politics.

CITY AND COUNTY INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Most stakeholders indicated that the only difference in crime between Teton County as a
whole and cities like Driggs and Victor was one of scale—densely populated areas simply
provide more opportunities for crime. This presumption creates tension between cities and
the county, and more specifically the role of each.
This tension is particularly relevant to Driggs city officials’ argument that, under the
contract, they felt they were paying the TCSO to conduct law enforcement actions it was
already statutorily obligated to provide. Some stakeholders described the issue as “double
taxing” or “paying twice.” Their rationale is that all county residents pay taxes to fund the
County Sheriff, who is obligated to enforce state laws throughout the county. By having
city residents pay additional fees through an extra service contract, those residents are,
in effect, paying twice—once at the county level and again at the city level. However, it is
common across Idaho (and the U.S.) for governments to pay for additional services that
may not be needed elsewhere. In the context of the agreement between Driggs and the
TCSO, the county was contracted to provide services within the city, i.e., enforcing city
code, that the TCSO did not provide in rural areas.
Driggs and Teton County used a Joint Powers Agreement (JPA), which are common
agreements between county sheriff’s offices and municipalities across Idaho. Under Idaho
Code 31-2227, the county sheriff has the primary duty of enforcing all penal provisions
and statutes of the state. Under Guidelines issued by the Idaho Attorney General’s Office
(5/16/89), “…it is clear that a sheriff has a duty to enforce state penal laws within the
boundaries of a city regardless of whether that city has a police department or not. There
is no requirement that the city reimburse the sheriff for enforcing state penal laws within
city boundaries” (p. 2).
The Guidelines also stress that county sheriffs are not obligated to enforce city ordinances.
“The county sheriff does not have authority to enforce county ordinances within a city’s
limits, nor does he have the power to enforce city ordinances, absent an agreement by the
city to contract for such services from the county sheriff” (p. 4). Further, “A city, in lieu of
hiring its own police force, may find it more profitable to contract with the county sheriff
to increase the sheriff’s manpower and provide extra protection within the city limits.
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Such an agreement could provide for a resident deputy, extra patrol, or enforcement of
city ordinances” (p. 4). Figure 1 provides an overview of the sheriff’s jurisdiction in Teton
County.

FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE SHERIFF’S JURISDICTION IN TETON COUNTY

Thus, the contract for service can best be understood as an expansion of the Sheriff’s
existing scope of responsibility. The county’s taxes and the city’s contract pay for two
separate services. If considered on its own, it is unlikely that Driggs’ contracted amount of
$57,000 could fund more than the salary of a single officer, let alone additional operating
expenses not associated with salary. As the contract did not specify that funds would be
used on a single, dedicated Driggs deputy, TCSO had discretion over how the funds would
be used to offset the cost of additional services in Driggs.
This underscores the need for a better understanding of the role of counties and cities,
and perhaps more directly, what cities are paying for under expanded service agreements.
The city is under no obligation to contract with the county, especially if they feel they
are not receiving any added value from the contract or that services are not sufficiently
rendered. But, given these distinctions and the widespread use of city-county contractsfor-service across Idaho, it would be inaccurate to classify them as “paying twice.” Rather,
the JPA allows one government (Driggs in this case) to pay a second government (Teton
County) to provide services that the city officials desire; these are services that are
beyond the scope the sheriff’s office would provide without the JPA.
5

CODE ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITY
There is disagreement among city and county officials regarding whether TCSO has met
the terms of the contract with regard to enforcement of city code: One side believes
the contract clearly charges TCSO with the responsibility of enforcement of all city
code violations, while the other sees discretion that is necessarily subject to the realities
of limited resources and prioritization. A better understanding of expectations at the
contract’s outset can help address this.
The previous agreement called for TCSO to “enforce city ordinances at the request of
the Mayor,” but city code is multifaceted and can encompass a variety of issues, some
examples being public safety, assault, animal control, parking violations, firework displays
and building codes. Some of these traditionally fall to police organizations to enforce, such
as assault, but others—like building codes—may not necessitate a response by a sworn
officer that may not have the necessary professional expertise and can instead be handled
by city planning departments. The language of the contract does not make this distinction,
which can create an expectation on Driggs’ part that TCSO is obligated to handle all
city code violations. At the same time, devoting deputies’ time to civil infractions can
be an inefficient use of resources, especially when responses to such infractions are not
responsibilities typically associated with sworn law enforcement officers.
During stakeholder interviews, Driggs city officials cited traffic enforcement and animal
control as two of the most pressing public problems they would like to see addressed by
law enforcement officials. City officials in Victor, conversely, characterized building code
enforcement as a gaping hole, though they were quick to acknowledge that this was
likely due to the resources and skills not being available, rather than professional neglect.
A county official said that TCSO prioritizes felonies over citations, especially during
periods of understaffing, which may have contributed to fewer citations issued for traffic
enforcement and animal control.
TCSO expressed a willingness to house a county resource officer, which would encompass
both code enforcement and animal control responsibilities, but said other stakeholders
had rejected the proposal due to cost concerns. They also noted concerns with the validity
of city ordinances, a reference that stemmed from an experience where an ordinance
was ruled invalid on a technicality after the sheriff’s and prosecutor’s offices had devoted
resources towards its enforcement.
The county prosecutor indicated that code enforcement matters fell more under the
prosecutor’s office than the sheriff’s, but suggested that the current prosecutorial contract
is too vague. The FY 2015 prosecutorial services agreement between Driggs and Teton
County called for the prosecutor’s office to “prosecute violations of state misdemeanors
and infractions and violations of county or city ordinances committed within the
municipal limits of the City.” But there are legitimate concerns over whether this is meant
to encompass all offenses or only criminal offenses. The cities have one view while the
prosecutor’s office has another. This is something both parties must clarify.
In short, our interviews suggest that Driggs officials understanding is that the contract
clearly charges the sheriff’s or prosecutor’s office with the responsibility of enforcement/
prosecution of city code violations, while the officials from TCSO believe that how they
will use deputy and staff time to enforce contracts is subject to their discretion. The
6

different interpretations speak to an underlying issue, which a stakeholder in Victor
described as lacking a mutual understanding of expectations. Thus, greater specificity and
enumerated expectations regarding city code in the contract itself can help clarify this
misunderstanding.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Another issue identified by officials from Driggs is a perceived lack of transparency and
accountability from TCSO. This issue was brought up in prior negotiations in 2015 during
a September 9th meeting, where the Driggs Mayor expressed that he cannot document
whether TCSO is fulfilling the terms of the contract (BOCC minutes, p. 2). During an
interview with the research team, the Mayor indicated the issue had existed across
multiple sheriff administrations and extended back at least to 2000. City officials also said
that, in their view, there is limited accountability for law enforcement and no transparency
or insight into their training procedures.
Stakeholders not affiliated with Driggs or TCSO suggested that repeated loss of talent to
surrounding jurisdictions with better pay (such as Jackson, WY) compounds the problem.
This can leave TCSO understaffed or with replacements who have not received as much
training as those who left. Driggs officials indicated that the Sheriff is not responsive when
asked about training procedures for his deputies.
Officer training procedures are typically an internal matter that the Sheriff controls
and the contract for service between Driggs and Teton County does not address them.
While the city’s request is understandable, it is likely viewed as beyond the scope of the
contractual relationship between the county and the city, as well as an intrusion on TCSO’s
autonomy to run the organization as it sees fit. Given that Driggs is paying for additional
service, though, it would likely improve city-county relations if TCSO was willing to provide
additional information to city officials regarding officer training and internal oversight
mechanisms. This is indicative of another misalignment of expectations.
As multiple stakeholders noted, the Sheriff is accountable, first and foremost, to the voters
of Teton County. In regards to accountability for the agreement, it is important to note that
the contract calls for “quarterly written reports detailing the number of calls for service,
violations of municipal ordinances and State statutes including civil citations issued,
incidents handled, and security checks within the City.” If these reports are not occurring,
or the timeline is not sufficient, this should be addressed in future contracts.

PUBLIC SECURITY AND SERVICES PROVIDED
Stakeholders in Driggs did not feel that services outlined in the contract with TCSO were
adequately provided. Driggs’ contract mandated both security checks and directed patrols
above and beyond regular police services. On the former, officials specifically noted
checking city-owned facilities to deter vandalism and ensure buildings were secured. The
perception among officials is that these checks were not occurring or could be achieved at
a reduced cost by using a private company.
There is available data on security checks in Teton County. Total call volume for Driggs
averaged around 30 percent of countywide responses, per call data provided by TCSO,
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whereas the city is comprised of only 16 percent of the county’s population. While the
overall number of security checks increased year-to-year, Driggs’ proportionate share
substantially declined when they terminated the contract with TCSO. In 2016, the last
year of the contract, TCSO performed 1,430 security checks in Driggs. This constituted 56
percent of all security checks performed by TCSO countywide. In 2017, with no contract,
TCSO performed 1,243 security checks in Driggs, which amounted to 41 percent of all
security checks countywide, a 15 percent decline. This is an indicator that in terms of
volume, the contract did result in a greater number of security checks within city limits,
though it does not tell us where, specifically, those checks were directed. In addition, even
without a contract, over 1,200 security checks were executed in Driggs.
As for services, a frequent response from stakeholders was that animal control
ordinances—focusing on stray dogs, specifically—were not well enforced. City officials
from Driggs, Victor and Tetonia all cited loose dogs and experiences where citizens had
been bitten as pressing problems in need of more attention. TCSO indicated that they did
not view strays as high of a priority issue as the cities did. In addition, strays are often
gone by the time sheriff deputies arrive and the deputies lack specialized equipment to
detain and transport animals. However, TCSO indicated a willingness to house a dedicated
animal control officer if cities would help offset the cost. To date, proposals have been
either cost prohibitive or presented too late in budgeting processes to be accommodated.
However, left unaddressed, this issue contributes to a perception among some that
contracted services are not being delivered.

LOCAL POLITICS
Finally, several interviewees noted there is a now profound generational and cultural divide
between the cities and the county. This divide is exacerbated by Driggs’ growth both as
a tourist destination and as a bedroom community for Jackson, WY. One of the issues we
see across the U.S. is increasing political polarization, a cleavage particularly noteworthy
among rural communities and growing towns.
Against this backdrop, a contentious election cycle casts a shadow on all the
aforementioned issues. In areas where elections are competitive, polarization can create
animosity between leading politicians in the community. Throughout our interviews,
stakeholders noted animus between Driggs officials and the Teton County Sheriff as being
an additional challenge. Some believe this has led to policy intransigence on both sides.
Several stakeholders felt that some sort of compromise between the two sides would be
the most beneficial outcome. There was a general sense that all entities working together
serves the community best and greater collaboration can only be a good thing.

STAKEHOLDER MAP
We have summarized stakeholder responses regarding their perceptions of the public
security needs in Teton County, what factors contributed to the cancellation of the TCSO
contract and what potential difficulties they anticipate with no contract in place in the
following stakeholder map. In order to preserve the relative anonymity of responses,
stakeholders have been grouped by type: City of Driggs, Other Cities in Teton County
(Victor & Tetonia), Teton County Officials (BOCC, Sheriff, Prosecutor & Public Defender)
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and Community Members (Teton School District 401, TREC, Teton Aviation, Huntsman
Springs & Former County Prosecutor).

TABLE 1: STAKEHOLDER MAP
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OPTIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
To address the City of Driggs’ law enforcement needs going forward, there are several
options available. IPI was specifically directed to assess some, while others arose over the
course of our study through analysis of stakeholder interviews or a review of the literature.
This section evaluates five law enforcement options: 1) Status Quo; 2) Restoration of
Services; 3) Code Enforcement Officer; 4) City Police Force; and 5) Unified Regional
Model.
The City of Driggs contracted with IPI to estimate the approximate cost of each option
over time. These projections should be considered conservative, with annual year-to-year
growth estimated at three percent. Even so, some estimates require the establishment of
funding formulas between jurisdictions. These are estimates only and were not discussed
with stakeholders.
Cost is a significant factor of our analysis. When asked, none of the stakeholders we
interviewed felt that Teton County taxpayers would be receptive to a tax increase in
order to fund a new policing mechanism. A few allowed the possibility that voters could
be swayed by a very convincing argument, but were doubtful one could be made. One
representative from the City of Driggs suggested that an overall cost savings is their
objective. Given the relatively modest size of the contract for service, if this feeling is
shared, it suggests several of these options are cost prohibitive.

OPTION 1: STATUS QUO
The first option, moving forward, is the status quo: no contract between the City of Driggs
and Teton County for expanded law enforcement. Currently, the TCSO is responsible for
enforcing state and county laws. City ordinance violations are unenforced and security
checks and patrols are conducted solely at the direction of TCSO.
With no contract, there would be no monetary cost to Driggs directly associated with this
alternative. The $57,000 previously allocated for the expanded service contract could be
applied elsewhere in the city’s budget. This option requires a higher risk tolerance from
the City, as there is a greater possibility of property damage or other criminal activity in
the absence of regular security checks.
That said, several stakeholders commented that they had not noticed any change in
service delivery since the cancellation of the Driggs contract and did not anticipate
any major problems due to its absence. Several were amenable to continuing without a
contract—especially if the intent was to save money.
The Status Quo option is the simplest alternative to implement, as it requires actors to
take no further action. Underlying concerns would remain unaddressed, however, and
some stakeholders may be dissatisfied with the outcome.
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OPTION 2: RESTORE SERVICES
A second alternative is to resume contracted services between Driggs and TCSO. This
would restore additional services to Driggs, but would likely do little to address their
concerns unless the contract more specifically outlines expectations and services
provided.
As noted in a previous section, some stakeholders were under the impression that the
contract with TCSO was for police protection, period, and that without a contract it would
go away. This could be due, in part, to the vagueness and imprecision in the existing
additional coverage agreement, which titled item 1 “Police Services.” As the agreement
noted, these services were “in combination with its statutory duty to police the entire
County.” It is understandable that this language could result in the mistaken impression
that without the contract these basic police services might not be provided within city
limits. However, the additional coverage of the contract is better understood to encompass
security checks, enforcement of city ordinances and directed patrols. The contract’s cost
likely helps TCSO cover the additional expense of these activities.
In order to address Driggs’ concerns, the contract would need to be more explicit in
delineating what and how additional services are provided. For comparison, the Ada
County Sheriff’s Office has long had a JPA with the City of Eagle (population 24,785).
Eagle contracts with Ada County to provide for an Eagle Police Department. All Eagle
Deputies are considered employees of the Ada County Sheriff, but their primary
deployment is within the city’s boundaries. While it constitutes a much larger contract
($2,314,670.19 annually, or $93,389.96 per 1,000 persons), it is also more explicit in the
services provided (see box below), reporting mechanisms, cost (including a full budget
breakdown) and the city’s responsibilities (see also Appendix A). The contract also
explicitly states that control of personnel, standards, discipline and all other aspects of
performance shall be governed by the Ada County Sheriff’s Office, not the City.

“City services” are defined as:
a. Reactive patrol to enforce state law and City-adopted municipal,
criminal, and traffic codes and to respond to residents’ and business’ calls
for service.
b. Proactive patrol to prevent and deter criminal activity.
c. Traffic patrol to enforce applicable traffic codes.
d. Deputies and Detectives to investigate local crimes occurring within the
city limits.
e. Community crime prevention.
f. Support services necessary to provide law enforcement services.
g. Communications services, including call receiving, dispatch, and reports.
h. Code enforcement of city code violations. The Code Enforcement office
will also assist patrol with crash scenes and report writing.
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TABLE 2: CITY POLICE COMPARISON

Table 2 provides an overview of select Idaho cities and resort towns, including their
population, police budget, total city budget and police cost per 1,000 persons. As a
percentage of overall city expenditures, police services range from 7 percent (Ketchum) of
the overall budget to 52 percent (Salmon). On a per capita basis, Ammon spends the least
on police services ($97,731 per 1,000 persons) while Ketchum spends the most ($613,442
per 1,000 persons).
Against these contracts, the former agreement’s annual cost ($57,000, or $32,834.10 per
1,000 persons) is not unreasonable for Driggs’ size and tax base. The former agreement’s
primary shortcoming appears to be vague language and a misunderstanding of what it
was supposed to accomplish. Identified concerns (e.g., accountability, security checks,
code enforcement, etc.) are best addressed through the contract itself, with agreement by
both parties. The Eagle-Ada agreement outlines expectations over nine pages, including
an itemized budget. Conversely, the Driggs-Teton agreement was two pages with a flat
fee. It would be beneficial to both parties to have a more explicit contract, one that details
services provided—like those referenced —and their associated costs.
Assuming these concerns can be addressed through contract negotiation, Table 3
summarizes expected city costs under a restored contract arrangement. Assuming a
$57,000 base price and three percent annual growth, the average annual cost would be
$59,614 for years 0-3, $65,116 for years 4-5, and $72,269 for years 6-10.
restore services

TABLE 3: COST TO RESTORE SERVICES
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OPTION 3: CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
Hiring a code enforcement officer would address the code enforcement issue. In Idaho,
code enforcement officers are typically part of either the city’s planning department or the
city’s law enforcement. When part of a police force, these officers are not sworn deputies
and are not able to enforce criminal laws within the state. Instead, they enforce civil
ordinances (e.g., parking, signage and nuisance ordinances), but are sometimes called on
to aid law enforcement with traffic accident response.
Almost across the board, stakeholders from Driggs, Victor, Tetonia, Teton County and the
greater community all identified a need for better code enforcement. Several mentioned
previous attempts to create a position, either housed within the county (and thus available
to cities through contract) or shared between cities. At least one proposal included a joint
code enforcement/animal control officer. Conflicting reasons were given for why these
proposals failed—either the cities did not want the added expense, the county did not
want the added expense, or some combination of the two. Whatever the case, the cost
was viewed as prohibitive, even when shared.
Under the previously mentioned Eagle-Ada contract, the code enforcement officer
receives an annual salary of $59,214. According to Payscale.com, salaries for code
enforcement officers range from $26,529 to $60,302. The median annual salary is $41,618.
In addition to salary and benefits, the officer would need a dedicated vehicle in order to
perform his or her duties. Given the widespread need for code enforcement, there are
opportunities for jurisdictions to partner and share the code enforcement officer, thereby
reducing their individual cost burden.
Table 4 summarizes the anticipated costs for a dedicated code enforcement officer over
time. Using the median salary as the base, we assumed a three percent annual cost-ofliving increase and benefits as 30 percent of salary. We also assumed a seven-year lifespan
for the vehicle, necessitating capital purchases in year zero and year seven, with the
purchase price slightly higher in year seven to account for inflation. Approximately onethird of the vehicle’s cost was budgeted in its year of purchase to cover fuel, maintenance
and insurance expenses, with a three percent annual growth rate thereafter. Operating
expenses were assumed to be five percent of the overall cost, excluding the capital cost of
the vehicle.
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TABLE 4: CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

code enforcement

Under these assumptions, the average annual cost for a code enforcement officer is
anticipated to be approximately $73,181 in years 0-3, $73,870 in years 4-5, and $86,348 in
years 6-10. If these costs are split evenly between Driggs, Victor and Teton County, each
entity would be responsible for an average $24,394 in the first three years, $24,623 in
years 4-5, and $28,783 in years 6-10. If costs are split only between the cities of Driggs and
Victor, on average each would be responsible for $36,590 in years 0-3, $36,935 in years
4-5 and $43,174 in years 6-10.
These estimates do not include animal control duties, which would require additional
equipment and training. The cost of that position was estimated by the Teton County
Sheriff’s Office in FY 2018 at $82,080. Stakeholders considered this option in the past, but,
as previously mentioned, most indicated it was either too expensive or introduced too late
in the budgeting cycle to accommodate.

OPTION 4: CITY POLICE FORCE
Another alternative is the creation of a city police force. Most stakeholders felt this
alternative was cost prohibitive. This may well be the case, as salary costs alone would
quickly eclipse the cost of the former contract. Estimating the actual cost of creating a
new police department presents many challenges, as it requires determining, among other
things, salary levels, staffing levels, vehicle fleet size and dispatch fees.
The U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) produces population-based ratios of how many
full-time officers communities have per 1,000 persons. BJS ratios from 2013 suggest 2.4
officers are needed for every 1,000 persons in communities with populations between
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1,000 and 2,499. The U.S. Census estimates Driggs’ 2017 population at 1,805, which would
translate into five officers (4.33).
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) believes these ratios are a poor
indicator of staffing needs and are only useful in identifying staffing trends. Consequently,
IACP does not recommend their use. There is a greater movement towards analyzing callsfor-service volume broken down by time of day to determine staffing allocation. These
methods presuppose the existence of a law enforcement organization and thus are little
help in identifying how many officers are needed to staff a new police department in a city
the size of Driggs.
To determine the necessary staffing level, we began with the series of assumptions
summarized in Table 5. First, we assume two full-time officers (FTOs) per shift and a
standard 40-hour work week (note that TCSO budgets patrol deputies with a 41.75hour work week). We also assumed shifts are approximately eight hours in length, which
translates to a minimum requirement of three shifts per day. Each full-time officer would
be able to complete five shifts per week. Three shifts per day means that there would be
2,190 total shifts per year, which translates into 17,520 total patrol hours per year.
With 40-hour work weeks, each FTO could work a potential 260 shifts per year (52
weeks). Assuming a reduction of four weeks to accommodate annual vacation/sick time,
the actual number of shifts a FTO can work is 240 per year or 1,920 labor hours. Total
shifts (2,190) divided by FTO shift capacity (240) results in a workforce requirement of
9.13 officers, which must be rounded up to 10.

TABLE 5: CITY POLICE FORCE ASSUMPTIONS

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Law Enforcement Salary Calculator
lists the midpoint annual salary of a GS-2 pay grade (high school diploma with no
other experience) law enforcement officer as $25,876. This is far below the salaries for
surrounding areas, which would likely result in the same loss-of-personnel issues that
TCSO already experiences. Patrol Deputy salaries in Jackson, WY range from $51,587 to
$74,669 annually. According to OPM figures for the GS-5 pay grade (college degree),
the midpoint annual salary is $44,167. This is still below surrounding jurisdictions, but not
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egregiously so for a new department.
There would be an added cost to the police department for access to and integration
into the countywide emergency dispatch system, which Teton County controls. During
stakeholder interviews, the Sheriff indicated that there would be a $100,000 annual
cost minimum, possibly more if the increased workload necessitated hiring additional
personnel.
Table 6 provides a broad cost estimate for a Driggs city police department over time.
Salaries are calculated using the OPM GS-5 midpoint salary, with benefits assumed to
be 30 percent of salary. As discussed, we budgeted for 10 officers. The vehicle pool
is assumed to be half the number of officers. We also assume a seven-year lifespan
for vehicles, with approximately one-third of the vehicle’s cost in the year of purchase
budgeted to cover maintenance, fuel and insurance. We assume operating costs as five
percent of the total cost (excluding vehicle capital costs and dispatch fee). An annual
increase of three percent over the previous year is assumed for all categories excluding
benefits and vehicle capital costs.

TABLE 6: CITY POLICE FORCE

City police force

Under this model, we estimate costs at $853,948 in year 0 with a projected increase to
$998,274 by year 10. The average annual cost to Driggs would be approximately $804,805
during the first three years, $848,738 during years 4-5, and $969,025 in years 6-10.
Should the City of Driggs and the City of Victor wish to partner in a joint city police force,
assuming equal shares, these costs would be approximately halved to $426,974 in year 0
and $499,137 in year 10. The average annual cost to each city would be $402,402 in years
0-3, $424,369 in years 4-5 and $484,512 in years 6-10.
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The combined cost of Driggs’ 2016 contract for service ($57,000) and Victor’s 2018
contract with TCSO (~$52,000) is approximately $109,000. Given the significant cost
of a police department, unless substantial resources in both cities are reallocated to law
enforcement, this option is likely cost prohibitive. This may be especially true considering
that the cost projection only includes officers and their vehicles and does not account for
support staff or a physical location. While the operating cost line item can absorb some
of the cost of uniforms and weapons, their expense may be greater, especially in the initial
year. As such, these estimates are best considered as likely minimum costs under the
assumptions outlined. Note that final cost could be higher.

OPTION 5: UNIFIED REGIONAL MODEL
A final alternative suggested by city officials in Driggs at the outset of this study was the
unified regional model currently in place in Salt Lake County, Utah. Under this unified
system, several cities and townships have pooled their resources to create a single
police force. Elected officials from participating jurisdictions form a 13-member Board of
Directors that has direct oversight of the department. The elected County Sheriff serves
as the CEO of the Department alongside a five person executive team that consists of an
Undersheriff, Deputy Chief, Chief Financial Officer, head of human resources and Chief
Legal Counsel. The Department is subdivided into seven precincts, each with its own
Chief, which provide services to specific communities (in effect serving as local police
departments). The Unified Department provides an array of pooled resources available to
each precinct.

FIGURE 2: SALT LAKE UNIFIED POLICE DEPARTMENT

The combined community oversight of law enforcement under the unified regional model
is appealing to some Driggs stakeholders, who suggested it might serve as an impetus for
jurisdictions to work more cooperatively. Others see it as duplicating a service the County
Sheriff already provides, unnecessarily complicating matters or attempting to expand the
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scope of the cities’ political control.
The Salt Lake Unified Police Department (UPD) was created in 2009 under the authority
of Section 11-13-204, Utah Code (the Interlocal Cooperation Act). Section 67-2328, Idaho
Code (Joint Exercise of Powers) similarly empowers public agencies of the state (which
counties and cities are both considered) to enter into voluntary agreements for the
“exercise of joint power, privilege or authority.” This is the same statute that authorizes
the previous contracts for additional coverage. These agreements are required to specify
duration, purpose, financing and termination procedures, among other things. In order
to implement a unified regional model in Idaho, the Teton County Sheriff’s office, Teton
County and the Cities of Driggs, Victor and Tetonia could theoretically enter into an
agreement to create a unified police department with a unique oversight board that
consisted of the Sheriff, Mayors and County Commissioners under mutually agreed upon
terms.
Per Idaho code, this system can only be established voluntarily, with the consent of
all parties. In addition to the cities of Driggs and Victor, both the Board of County
Commissioners and the County Sheriff would have to agree to participate. The
Commission and Sheriff are equal officers of the county, with the former controlling the
budget and the latter controlling personnel and holding the statutory authority for law
enforcement. The Commissioners lack the authority to impose this system on the Sheriff
and are prohibited from using their budgetary authority to “control…other county officers”
(Idaho Attorney General’s Opinion, 86-10, p. 8). While the benefit of expanded political
control to the cities is readily apparent, the incentives for the County Sheriff are more
nebulous. Generally, the incentive for this type of structure would be financial.
Consider the financial arrangement of the Salt Lake Unified Police Department. In FY 2019,
Salt Lake County is budgeted to contribute the largest financial share, 21.04 percent of
member revenues ($14,428,370). The next highest single contributor is Millcreek, which
provides 14.44 percent ($9,903,543). The smallest city contributor to the UPD is Herriman
City at 1.61 percent ($1,101,123). Townships and unincorporated areas collectively account
for 22.56 percent of member revenues ($15,469,967).

TABLE 7: FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE SALT LAKE UPD
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Conversely, TCSO’s FY 2018 budget (which does not include Dispatch, Jail, or Law
Enforcement Center expenses) totaled $1,296,809. The City of Driggs’ FY 2016
payment totaled $57,000, while the City of Victor’s FY 2018 contract with the Sheriff is
approximately $52,000. If these were the financial contributions to a Teton Unified Police
Department, Teton County would be responsible for 92.25 percent of the budget, Driggs
4.05 percent and Victor 3.70 percent. It is unlikely that a 7.75 percent budget increase is
enough to convince TCSO to cede its existing political control.
In the case of Salt Lake County, the Sheriff’s Office received nearly five times the revenue
they themselves contributed. The pooled resources benefitted the Sheriff as much as
the communities served. Put another way, those communities brought $54 million to the
table. Conversely, a $109,000 increase to the TCSO’s existing $1.3 million budget is poor
incentive to encourage surrender of the office’s current autonomy.
In order for the Unified Regional Model to be a viable alternative in terms of participant
buy-in, budgetary contributions would have to be more equitable. One alternative is for
the county to contribute 40 percent, while Driggs and Victor contribute 30 percent each.
From 2015 through March 2018, Driggs averaged 29 percent of Teton County’s total callsfor-service, a figure very much in line with a 30 percent contribution.
A more favorable allocation for Driggs would be population-based. According to U.S.
Census estimates, from 2010 through 2017, an average 16.06 percent of the population of
Teton County lives in Driggs, while an average 18.79 percent live in Victor. The remaining
65.15 percent of the population live in Tetonia or unincorporated Teton County.
Table 8 uses these population shares to project the contributions of Teton County, Driggs
and Victor over time. We assume that the County’s initial 65.15 percent contribution is
equal to TCSO’s FY 2018 budget, or $1.3 million. Under this assumption, Driggs’ initial 16.06
percent contribution would be $319,674, while Victor’s 18.79 percent would translate to
$374,014. The total budget for a unified regional police department would be $1,990,497.
This would give TCSO access to an additional $693,688, which would provide greater
incentive to consider the new arrangement. Assuming three percent annual growth, by
year 10 the total budget of the unified department would be $2,675,062.

TABLE 8: UNIFIED MODEL, TCSO MAINTAINS CURRENT LEVELS
OF SPENDING

Unified Model 1
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An alternative approach is to use TCSO’s FY 2018 budget as the total cost of the unified
police department, in which case Driggs’ and Victor’s contributions would introduce
cost savings to the County. Under this model, Teton County’s initial contribution would
translate to $844,871, Driggs’ to $208,268 and Victor’s to $243,670. In effect, TCSO would
save approximately $451,938. By year 10, the total budget projects to be $1,742,803. Table
9 summarizes these projections.

TABLE 9: UNIFIED MODEL, TCSO SAVES FROM CURRENT SPENDING LEVEL

Like the city police department alternative, given the expressed financial concerns of
Unified Model 2
Driggs and Victor this option seems particularly cost prohibitive. Additionally, it is not
clear that there is enough of a population demand in Teton County for such a unique
policing structure. Salt Lake County has an estimated 2017 population of 1,135,649. The
populations of member cities range from 30,709 (Holladay) to 60,192 (Millcreek). Current
data on smaller townships and unincorporated areas were unavailable, although 2010
Census estimates ranged from 825 (Copperton Metro Township) to 35,731 (Kearns Metro
Township). Conversely, the total population of Teton County in 2017 is estimated at 11,381.
Additionally, in May 2018 one member of the Salt Lake UPD decided to leave the
arrangement. Voting unanimously, the City Council of Herriman City (population 39,224)
stated that they were no longer receiving service commensurate with their contribution to
the organization, paying for 18 officers but only having 13 posted within their community
(McAdam, 2018). Consequently, they wished to leave the partnership and form their own
city police department. In July, a second member, Riverton City (population 43,344), also
announced their intent to withdraw from the UPD (Green & McKane, 2018).

SOLUTIONS STAKEHOLDER MAP
The following stakeholder map summarizes stakeholder responses regarding possible
solutions, preferences among potential models and the public’s receptiveness to potential
tax increases in order to fund a new policing structure. Once again, in order to preserve
the relative anonymity of responses, stakeholders have been grouped by type: City of
Driggs, Other Cities in Teton County (Victor & Tetonia), Teton County Officials (BOCC,
Sheriff, Prosecutor & Public Defender) and Community Members (Teton School District
401, TREC, Teton Aviation, Huntsman Springs & Former County Prosecutor).
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TABLE 10: STAKEHOLDER MAP OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
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CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the challenges facing the City of Driggs and Teton County related to
law enforcement service delivery. The results of stakeholder interviews, budget estimates
and analysis of alternatives provided in this report can be utilized by officials as they
consider potential solutions to Driggs’ law enforcement needs.
Our analysis suggests misalignment of expectations poses a significant challenge for
all parties. Competing needs of code enforcement and police services have taxed an
already strained system, leaving stakeholders dissatisfied and needs unmet. Additionally,
increasing political polarization has clouded an already complex issue and forestalled
further cooperation.
Given this situation, we analyzed five alternatives for Driggs’ consideration of their law
enforcement needs going forward: a no-contract status quo; a restoration of the county
contract for additional services with more explicit expectations; the creation of a new
code enforcement officer; the creation of a city police force; and establishing a unified
regional police department with oversight shared between jurisdictions. Most of these
options carry significant financial cost, one option (city police force) is nearly 15 times
the cost of the previous contract. Given feedback obtained during stakeholder interviews,
these higher priced options are likely cost prohibitive.
There are some crucial takeaways from our analysis. First and foremost, all parties
could benefit from more explicit terms and expectations in contracts. Establishing the
boundaries of those expectations and clearly delineating respective roles can help
avoid situations where parties have conflicting views of whether terms were met and
services delivered. Along similar lines, several ancillary issues like more detailed reporting
procedures can help address concerns over accountability or institutional transparency.
These issues could be best addressed through explicit contractual obligations,
acknowledged and agreed to by all parties beforehand. Looking at similar agreements
outside the region and learning from past experiences can help refine contract language
and improve clarification.
A final takeaway is that many of the law enforcement alternatives are very costly. Several
stakeholders indicated they would be cost prohibitive, but that is a determination best left
to the policy-makers in Driggs and Teton County. The high cost of alternatives underscores
that small communities with limited financial resources are more likely to benefit by
working together and overcoming impediments to cooperation.
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APPENDIX A:
EXCERPT FROM EAGLE-ADA COUNTY JPA
The Ada County Sheriff’s Office has long had a JPA with the City of Eagle to provide for an
Eagle Police Department. It is more explicit in describing the services provided, reporting
mechanisms, cost and the city’s responsibilities. Portions of the agreement are reproduced
here for reference.
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